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Abstract 
This paper empirically studies the location decisions of internet firms when they face high 
legal standards of privacy protection. Many factors might influence them: technological 
spillovers, lower taxation, and so on. Internet firms can also arbitrate national differences and 
many of them actually locate their activity in order to escape from national laws they consider 
over-stringent. In the current stage of development of the internet – the so-called Web 2.0 – 
the ease of access to personal data proved to be strategic input. So the more a jurisdiction 
makes collecting and using these data easy, the more attractive the country is, if all other 
things remain constant. One way for a firm to avoid such legal restrictions is to locate or to 
expand its business in less privacy protective countries. Our empirical results support this 'no-
privacy haven' hypothesis. In particular, we highlight a new privacy paradox according to 
which the more stringent certain online privacy laws are, the more they induce firms to locate 
their business in less stringent countries, and finally the weaker actual privacy protection on 
the internet is. 
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1. Introduction 
Privacy regulation is one of the most important debates in internet policy. For instance, 
Goldfarb & Tucker (2011) suggest that the EU’s e-Privacy Directive affects the performances 
of online advertising but more generally internet-based activities because of the importance of 
advertising revenues in supporting the development of the digital economy. A delicate 
compromise is to be found concerning legal restrictions on the commercial use of personal 
data. On the one hand, many online businesses are suspected of invading the privacy of 
individuals causing them various forms of harm. On the other hand, over-stringent rules can 
impede innovation on the web – targeted marketing, online customization – and perhaps 
impact internet firms' location decisions in favor of less protective countries. In turn, this 
could entail a race to the bottom leading to laxer privacy to the detriment of internet users. 
This may be a new privacy paradox, i.e. stronger local privacy laws entail a reduction in 
global privacy protection for internet users. This new paradox can be explained by the 
contrast between national jurisdictions and the 'global village' nature of the internet. 
In this paper, we pay particular attention to this dimension. We focus on privacy laws and ask 
how they affect the location decisions of internet firms in an international setting. In 
particular, we focus on the Web 2.0 services as the biggest users of personal data. Thus, our 
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main question is whether more stringent privacy laws in one country can lead firms to locate 
or to expand their business into less protective countries. 
One naïve approach might consist in considering the digital economy as a space where 
geography does not matter (Choi & Suh, 2005). As a consequence, no significant physical or 
technological barriers would prevent online activities from expanding into digital networks 
while remaining located in their respective country of origin. However, the facts suggest that 
internet firms tend to locate their business in countries that are often different from their 
national origin. Many factors may influence their location decisions: high-skilled and cheaper 
workers, spillovers and agglomeration effects, more favorable taxation, innovation policies, 
cluster development programs, and so on. Differences in national jurisdictions can also play 
an important role. Internet firms are often purported to locate their business overseas in order 
to exempt themselves from the jurisdiction of local law and thus benefit from a 'legal haven'. 
For instance, illegal file-sharing networks often locate their servers in copyright-free countries 
('copyright havens' or 'copyright hells'). In the field of privacy, Facebook located its European 
headquarters in countries like Ireland but not in France, where legal protection of personal 
data is more stringent.  
This paper shows that privacy and the legal protection of personal data explain the location 
decisions of internet firms. This result suggests a 'no-privacy haven' effect that induces them 
to locate their business in more privacy lax countries. 
The rest of this paper is organized into five sections. The next section provides a brief survey 
of the literature that seeks to explain firms' location decisions. The third section presents our 
hypotheses. Section four describes the method: variables used and the econometric model. 
Section five presents the main results. Section six envisages some policy implications. 
2. Literature Review 
The internet has been thought of as an increasingly smaller place for business by virtually 
abolishing transportation costs (Cairncross, 1997) - services are delivered online – and factor-
mobility is enhanced thanks to telecommuting and videoconferencing, for instance. For 
internet users, national boundaries are transparent: Users can surf from one website to 
another, whatever the location of servers, websites and internet firms and, most of the time, 
without being informed of their nationality. As is the case with firms, managers, trade 
partners, and high-skilled workers can communicate and travel across national borders in a 
low-cost, quick and easy fashion. This, in turn, has abolished government barriers for many 
countries and thus facilitates the operation of online businesses. 
However, as has already been mentioned, many internet firms have multiple locations at the 
international level. This suggests that ITs have mixed effects on the cost of distance 
(Venables, 2001). ITs eliminate transport costs for online services – such as music or airline 
ticketing – that can be codified and then no longer need to be close to consumers. But the 
elimination of this kind of constraint does not mean that all other constraints are eliminated. 
Internet firms will relocate parts of their business according to lower costs and other non-
pecuniary advantages. The location decisions of firms can be explained by many factors 
prevailing at the international and regional levels. This can be conceived as a (simple) 
sequential process: the firm first chooses to locate or to expand its business in a specific 
country/international area and then it selects a specific location inside the country/area (Mayer 
& Muchielli, 1999). Alternatively, the firm can select directly among different regions and 
cities according to their respective attractiveness. But whatever the means of choosing a 
location, national determinants should always prevail and influence the actual decision of the 
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firm by affecting its costs and profits1. The legal protection of personal data can actually 
impact on these variables. 
Privacy economics: the impact of legal standards on firms’ revenue  
Since the 1970s many economic studies have investigated the effects of privacy on social 
welfare. In particular, economists have discussed the impact of this legal protection on market 
efficiency. For some scholars of the Chicago School, it reduces the quantity of available 
information on consumers, workers, job seekers, debtors, and so on. Thus, social welfare 
might be affected because of an inefficient matching of supply and demand (Posner, 1980, 
Stigler, 1978). However, with the advent of social networking services this perspective proves 
irrelevant since individuals tend to divulge an increasing volume of private information about 
themselves. 
More recently, scholars have identified different categories of costs incurred by firms when 
they have to comply with privacy legislation2. Acquisti (2010) distinguishes the costs of 
protecting data from those associated with disclosing them. In both cases, a higher protection 
of personal data might lead to a reduction in net gains of the firms that collect and use them. 
More protection can result in a decrease of the revenues of firms by preventing them from 
learning more about individuals and thus extracting more surplus from consumers, better 
personalizing their services, minimizing their advertising costs by better targeting customers, 
decreasing their inventory risks, better selection of job seekers, and so on. In addition, privacy 
laws can restrict the ability to resell consumer data, in particular with firms located in other 
countries. In some cases, such as that of France, specific administrative authorities control the 
international transfer of personal data. Unequal access to personal data can also prove a 
competitive disadvantage for firms that cannot collect them or that face restrictions. 
A significant increase in privacy protection can also lead to higher direct costs due to the 
expense of legal compliance. Breaking the privacy law can result in firms paying fines, legal 
expenses and damages. And being sentenced for a breach of privacy might constitute another 
opportunity cost in terms of a negative reputation leading to a reduction in sales or stock 
market value. To avoid such costs and their liabilities, firms might have to invest resources by 
hiring lawyers, adapting their contracts to the law, designing privacy charts to comply with 
the law and securing their databases. At an international level, multinational firms have to 
ensure that their terms and conditions conform to local privacy rules. All these costs are 
positively correlated with the legal standards of privacy and are different according to the 
regulation (Swire, 1997; Tang et al., 2008). 
From the sole viewpoint of firms, (more stringent) privacy rules are likely to decrease their 
profits when collecting and using personal data. Therefore, when facing different levels of 
privacy protection, one can expect them to lobby or arbitrate in favor of the less stringent 
ones. At the international level, this can turn out to be a decision in terms of location in 
different countries.	  Being	  profit	  maximizers,	  they	  will	  locate	  to	  countries/areas	  where	  the	  costs	  of	  production	  are	  minimized. In particular, internet firms are presumed to be the most 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Simply stated, firms will be assumed to systematically avoid both heavy taxation and wars, whatever talent and 
knowledge spillovers might prevail there. 
2 Of course, firms can also benefit from the legal protection of personal data (Hahn et al., 2001). For instance, 
direct marketers and online merchants can improve their business processes when those rules aim at fighting 
against spamming or customer identity theft. Moreover, collecting too much additional information can be costly 
for firms and market efficiency (Hermalin & Katz, 2006). Conversely, lax protection can induce mistrust from 
individuals that might consider firm strategies as too intrusive. 
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sensitive to the privacy laws because they use large amounts of personal data to run their 
online business.  
'Classical' factors for firms' location decisions 
Traditionally, firm location decision refers to foreign direct investment literature analyzing 
the impact of globalization. The progressive removal of trade barriers enables firms to 
develop international activities and strategies. In particular, factors such as wage and 
productivity levels, size of foreign markets, distance from the home country and income 
taxation influence their decision to produce abroad rather than producing at home for export. 
A foreign direct investment is conventionally classified according to the strategy adopted by 
the firm. Vertical integration exploits favorable conditions of factor prices in the country 
invested in whilst horizontal integration prevents trade costs from serving the host market 
locally. A single firm may however follow a complex strategy investing in both vertical and 
horizontal modalities. To illustrate this, American subsidiaries in Canada are composed of 
12% of horizontal FDI, 19% of vertical FDI and 69% of complex integration strategy of 
investment (Feinberg and Keane, 2003). Yeaple (2003) shows that vertical and horizontal FDI 
present a complementary relationship and, for intermediate levels of transport costs, only 
complex integration is worthy because of this relationship. Vertical integration allows for a 
lower cost per unit which expands sales, raising the firm´s capacity to engage horizontal FDI. 
Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2006) extend the analysis of Yeaple (2003) applying the 
heterogeneity of firms developed by Melitz (2003). They find several configurations of 
locations, according to the fixed costs incurred offshore. A general result is that the most 
productive firms tend to locate in countries with lower factor prices whilst the least productive 
firms stay in the home country. 
One can think of the web 2.0 sector as institutionally dependent. The products of internet 
firms require a low level of legal restriction that is ultimately determined by the institutions of 
a given country. Levchenko (2006) shows that countries with favorable institutions for this 
kind of product present a comparative advantage. Consequently, countries with low 
restrictiveness on the exploitation of data present an expansion of the internet firm sector, 
accommodating global demand3. 
Spillover effects and location decisions of high-tech firms and R&D activities 
Recent theoretical research into new economic geography studies the determinants of 
production patterns and firms' location decisions in an international setting (Krugman, 1991, 
Fujita, Krugman & Venables, 2001, Fujita and Thisse, 2002). Pecuniary and technological 
externalities influence firm location decisions. Pecuniary externalities refer to interactions 
generated by market and pricing mechanisms. Technological externalities are associated with 
factors such as the face-to-face exchange of information, access to intermediate inputs, high-
skilled workers and specialized technology suppliers, as well as market size. In particular, 
firms capture those knowledge spillovers through their proximity to other organizations. The 
notion of 'cluster' (Porter, 1998) encompasses these aspects. 
In particular, many factors affecting foreign R&D location decisions in high-tech sectors and 
R&D activities have been identified (Jones & Davis, 2000). Multinational firms locate and 
expand their R&D activities because they need to acquire and leverage innovative capacity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Levchenko (2006) considers the quality of the contracting institution, but the author points to other institutions 
such as the rigidity of labor market and union power (p. 797). 
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abroad while benefiting from economic spillovers generated by the co-location of competitors 
and business partners. The ability to access local scientific talent, creativity and technology, 
as well as the strategic possibility to observe competitors' R&D activities are key 
determinants. Demand factors also play an important role, i.e. being close to final markets and 
more responsive to local opportunities. 
Symmetrically, governments and local authorities seek to attract innovative firms and R&D 
activities in their respective countries and regions. Thus, the quality of the political 
environment is crucial. The level of appropriability regimes is not only determined by the 
quality of property law - in particular, patents and copyrights – but also by the level 
corruption and political risks. All these factors influence a firm’s decision about where and 
how much to expand their R&D activities. In some cases, governments can ameliorate the 
institutional environment of their countries by developing specific aspects such as scientific 
capability and telecommunications infrastructure and services. In so doing, governments can 
enter into a race to the top or… to the bottom to attract more R&D thus fostering national 
growth. 
'Pollution haven' hypothesis applied to privacy regulation: A race to the bottom? 
For certain sectors, the differential in terms of national regulations constitutes a factor that can 
explain the location and expansion of businesses. Firms	  will	  therefore	  engage	  in	  regulatory	  arbitrage,	   moving	   to	   countries	   with	   the	   lowest	   legal	   standards.	   Symmetrically, less 
stringent laws and regulations ranging from labor laws to bioethics can be considered a 
comparative advantage for countries that adopt them. States seeking to attract or fearing to 
lose firms can choose to soften regulatory standards. In particular, this 'race-to-the-bottom' 
hypothesis has been analyzed in the field of labor and environment regulation but without 
appreciable evidence of a strong correlation between legal standards and location decision 
(Drezner, 2006). However, these studies of the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis are based on a 
macroeconomic perspective and few investigations focus on the sector level. 
The 'pollution haven' hypothesis stipulates that national jurisdictions can turn into pollution 
havens since dirty industries can relocate in response to differences in regulatory stringency 
(Brunnermeier & Levinson, 2004). In the same way, by assimilating personal data users as 
(potential) privacy polluters4, privacy regulations can influence their location decision. But in 
the case of privacy legislation, the 'no-privacy haven' hypothesis is slightly different from the 
'pollution haven' framework. Differences among countries could be initially thought of as 
being unintentional from the perspective of lawmakers and regulators. They could result from 
different historical processes or culture or political contexts. And on this basis, firms can 
ground their location decisions by taking into account differences in the laxity of privacy 
national laws. 
We can also infer from all these aspects that features of the internet firm and its online 
activity might influence its location decisions. The size of the firm is an important 
determinant, even though it does not act so much as an incentive but more as a capability 
factor. The nature of the business model can impact on the need for personal data. In other 
words, the more intrusive the business model is, the more appealing will be a regulation based 
on a weaker protection of online privacy. This point refers to the above-mentioned 'no-
privacy haven' hypothesis. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The analogy we make here between natural environment and internet seems all the more relevant since those 
two 'milieu' make the production functions of firms, the utility functions of individuals, and the countries' 
welfare interdependent, and thus they are both likely to create negative externalities. 
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3. Hypotheses 
According to the literature reviewed in the previous section, the main factors that may explain 
the firm location decision can be grouped into two main categories.  
The first category evaluates the factors associated with the attractiveness of the country. The 
impact of this first category is captured through four kinds of variables: supply factors (the 
size of the high-tech sector; the size of the internet infrastructure), demand (population 
penetration of internet use), competitive/herding factors (the location of other internet firms, 
i.e. the number of internet firms located in the same country), and the institutional 
environment (the quality of the institutional environment; the stringency of privacy 
protection). 
We could expect a positive relationship between both an access to a much more developed 
telecom infrastructure and the decision to locate in that country. A more extensive internet 
connectivity is presumed to benefit internet firms. 
Hypothesis H1.1: Internet firms' decisions to locate depend positively on the size of the 
telecom infrastructure. 
Internet firms are presumed to choose on the basis of the differences in taxation between 
locations since a higher average rate will impact negatively on their profits. However, in the 
case of internet firms, this hypothesis can be challenged because most of the profits of the 
firm’s profits can be made in other countries. For instance, a web audience can be created in 
one country and advertising revenue paid in another country. 
Hypothesis H1.2: Location choices depend negatively on tax levels. 
Internet firms are a specific category of high-tech business. They need access to a highly 
skilled labor market and proximity to other firms in order to observe them.   
Hypothesis H1.3: The size of the high-tech sector in the host country and spillover effects 
are positively associated with the internet firm's decision to locate or to expand its 
business in that country. 
As already noted, fiscal or labor advantages are not always sufficient grounds upon which to 
base a location decision. Firms have to consider institutional stability too. Any location 
decision implies a certain level of investment that can represent a substantial loss if firms 
have to leave a country. Thus, firms have to take into account the risks inherent in politically 
unstable countries. At first glance, due to the immaterial nature of their business, internet 
firms are characterized by a much higher degree of footlessness than other industries. 
Actually, it depends upon the precise nature of the investment: creating a marketing 
department or implementing servers and communication networks does not generate the same 
level of investment. In any case, we presume that institutional stability impacts on the location 
decision of internet firms. 
Hypothesis H1.4: Evidence of institutional quality is positively associated with firm location 
decision in that country.	  
According the literature mentioned in the previous section, internet firms are presumed to be 
sensitive to the level of legal protection of personal data. In particular, such rules can hamper 
not only the methods of collecting and processing those information goods, but can also 
impact innovation in online services offered by internet firms and hence both their profits and 
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costs. Nonetheless, from our point of view, the 'death-of-distance' thesis might be true 
concerning the collection of personal data: whatever the restriction laws impose upon the 
method used to gather data, individuals are free to divulge what they want about themselves. 
So privacy rules about collection might not impact on the location decisions of internet firms. 
However, this is not the case with the legal constraints on the use of data collected and on the 
ways of building online services using this data. These privacy rules can hamper innovation 
and the way of doing business. They might explain the location decisions of internet firms. In 
turn, the more useful and innovative individuals judge online services, the more information 
they are willing to divulge about themselves. So privacy rules that regulate the processing and 
use of personal data prove crucial for firms when they decide to locate their business in 
various countries. 
Hypothesis H1.5: Evidence of privacy protection (high stringency) is negatively associated with 
firm location decision in that country. 
The second category of variables refers to features of the firm itself. All firms perform online 
business, but their activities can be more or less intensive in personal data. Thus, firms are 
expected to be sensitive to privacy rules in proportion to the intrusiveness of their online 
business.  
 
Hypothèse H2: The greater the privacy intrusiveness of online business, the more likely 
the internet firm is to decide to locate or to expand its business in countries with weaker 
privacy protection.	  	  
4. Methodology 
4.1 Econometric specification 
We investigate choice-specific determinants of industrial location through a Poisson 
estimator. In opposition to discrete choice models like the multinomial logit, the Poisson 
provides a more tractable model. Guimarães et al. (2003) show that both the conditional logit 
and the Poisson can present the same log likelihood and coefficients. 
Although the traditional estimator used for discrete multiple choices is the multinomial logit, 
we prefer to apply a Poisson estimator. With the Poisson we estimate the quantity of firms 
located in each destination with country specific dependent variables. Below we sketch the 
econometric model proving the equivalence between these two estimators. 
The utility of a firm k locating to country l is: 
klklkl
επ +ʹ′= zβ          (1) 
Where β is a vector of unknown parameters, zkl is a vector of explanatory variables, and εij is a 
random term. 
Adopting the appropriated distribution of errors, the probability that a given firm will choose 
a region l is expressed by a multinomial logit function (McFadden, 1974). Each location is 
identified by l and the total number of locations is equal to L. Thus, the probability of a firm k 
choosing location l is: 
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The log likelihood for the conditional logit is expressed by: 
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where dkl is equal to one if firm i chooses location l and is otherwise zero. 
While multinomial logit functions are a conventional way to estimate location choices, we 
follow Guimarães et al.  (2003) with the application of a Poisson estimator. This procedure 
provides a more tractable model, avoiding the problem of non-linearity.  
It is interesting to consider at this point that firms are aggregated by sector, which is the way 
the empirical analysis will proceed. Then, considering the quantity of firms qsl from sector s 
locating in country l to be Poisson distributed: 
( ) ( )lslseqE ls zβdα
ʹ′+ʹ′=          (4) 
where [α, β] are parameters to be estimated and dls is a vector of s dummy variables for each 
sector s. 
The Poisson model's likelihood is expressed as: 
( ) ( )[ ]∑∑
= =
−ʹ′+ʹ′+ʹ′+ʹ′−=
S
s
L
l
lslslslslslsp qqL
1 1
!logexp zβdαzβdα     (5) 
Considering the first order conditions with respect to αs: 
    (6) 
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€ 
qs = qls
l=1
L
∑  
Linking equation (6) to equation (5), the Poisson likelihood becomes: 
    (7) 
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The last two terms of equation (7) are constants. The first term is the log-likelihood of the 
conditional logit. Estimated coefficients are the same in both models. Estimated regressions 
are carried out using the Poisson model with quantities as the dependent variable.  
A very restrictive characteristic of the Poisson distribution is the equality between the mean 
and variance. However, if data violates this condition, it does not definitely invalidate the 
results. Firstly, in such cases, coefficients are nonetheless consistently estimated. Secondly, 
the quasi-maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE) can adjust standard errors (see 
Wooldridge 2001, section 19.2).5 
4.2 Sample and variables 
Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable is the Location Decisions of internet firms. Data on firms’ location 
were collected considering the 124 most viewed firms on the internet according to the Alexa 
ranking. Alexa provides a measurement of the audience of internet sites by computing traffic 
indicators based on a three month moving average of aggregated historical traffic data from 
millions of Alexa toolbar voluntary users. The main indicator developed and published by 
Alexa is “Traffic Rank” which yields the position of the site in interest with respect to all the 
sites on the web.  
We then produced original data on the locations of the corresponding internet firms. To 
construct the dependent variable, we collected the locations of the headquarters of 124 
internet firms spread over a total of 76 countries. Obviously, additional information about the 
precise nature of the locations – servers, R&D units, marketing subsidiaries and so on – 
would improve our results concerning the calculations of firms when trying to avoid over-
stringent privacy laws. It might help us to dissociate more accurately the relative effects of the 
tax system, spillovers… and privacy. However, because of a lack of necessary data that are 
often of a strategic nature, it proves impossible to formally test for more specific locations. 
Furthermore, as such, the location of the headquarters can be considered as relevant to an 
explanation of firms’ choices when trying to avoid over-stringent privacy laws. 
The locations of internet firms are aggregated according to 10 sectors ranging from 'search 
engines & web portals', 'online networking services', 'web hosting & sharing services', 'online 
press & information services', 'infomediaries', 'e-commerce', 'corporate websites', 'online 
administration', 'e-advertising' to 'online games'. Therefore, the dependent variable is the 
quantity of firms of a given sector s located in a given country l. These data were matched 
with the privacy index derived from the Privacy International Survey. Altogether, we obtain 
152 observations in 37 countries, i.e. 37 'privacy-rated' countries times 10 activities, less the 
number of 'holes' in terms of lack of localization. 
Explanatory variables 
Privacy index  
Data on privacy were collected from the The Privacy & Human Rights Report published by 
Privacy International (2007). The privacy index surveys the state of surveillance and privacy 
protection in 70 countries. It constitutes the most comprehensive report published on this 
topic. It is built by an international network of experts ranging from researchers, human	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Assuming that the variance is proportional to the mean, standard errors are corrected multiplying by 
the sum of Pearson residuals divided by the degree of freedom. 
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rights	   advocates	   and	   journalists to regulators and policy-makers around the world6. In 
particular, most of the criteria used to build this score are likely to affect the location 
decisions of internet firms: for instance, 'Privacy enforcement', 'Data sharing provisions', 
'Constitutional protections', and 'Statutory protection ' (see Appendix A1 for details). 
'Classical' variables: economy size, labor costs and profit taxes level 
Based upon the existing literature on determinants of firms’ location and FDI, our regressions 
also include proxies for taxes on business profits.7 These data were collected from World 
Bank Development indicators.8 
Spillover effect and the internet 
A variable evaluates technological externalities: a 'Business Technological Environment' 
index (source: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales9). In addition, 
we include the number of internet users that constitutes our proxy for measuring the general 
quality of the local telecom infrastructures. These aspects are potentially significant for 
internet firms looking for efficient communication networks. Furthermore, we test for the 
number of servers that is likely to influence the location decision because of better access to 
the internet. 
Institutional quality 	  
In our study we have two complementary proxies measuring institutional quality: 'Political 
Stability' and 'Transparency of public actions in the economic field' that were derived from 
the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (Cepii). The first variable 
measures the durability of a political regime and thus, the quality of the commitments of a 
given government. It might be sensitive for online press businesses and web hosting content 
that can prove political. The second variable is essential for an accurate evaluation of the 
economic environment, on the one hand, and the anticipation of the long-term strategy of a 
government in terms of economic policies concerning taxes, budget, money supply, exchange 
rate, and so forth, on the other. The transparency of economic policy assures accessibility and 
liability to information, improving firms’ perception of institutional quality. 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent variables. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 "The ranking assesses the key areas of surveillance and control, and will identify mechanisms of protection that 
have failed to operate according to the letter and spirit of the national and international privacy protections. It 
will concentrate on policy development issues, inadequacies in the consultation process, legal protections (or 
lack of them), the impact of surveillance on democratic institutions, changes to the nature of society and the 
implications for individual freedoms and autonomy." (Privacy International, 2007) 
7 The size of the economy measured by the GDP is correlated to the quantity of servers at 95%. This paper uses 
the latter variable as it constitutes a key element regarding telecom infrastructure required by internet firms. 
8 Although the cost of labor is an important control, available statistics do not detail industries compatible with 
the internet ones, providing data on sectors like “Manufacture of textiles” (see 
http://laborsta.ilo.org/default_F.html). 
9 See Appendix A1 and the Cepii website (www.cepii.fr) for more details about the construction of this variable. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Nb of obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Firms' location 152 2.59 4.52 1 38 
Privacy index 152 2.17 0.51 1.3 3.1 
Total tax rates (% commercial profits) 152 49.37 15.13 22.6 108.1 
Political stability 152 3.92 0.26 2.57 4 
Transparency of public economic actions  152 3.56 0.56 1.43 4 
Business technological environment 152 3.22 0.68 2.27 4 
Internet users (per 100 people) 152 0.62 0.23 0.053 0.918 
Servers 152 3.74 e+07 1.07 e+08 188000 4.39 e+08 
 
5. Results 
Table 2 reports the results for the determinants of the location of firms obtained using a 
Poisson QMLE estimator.10 The dependent variable is the quantity of firms in a given sector 
located in each country. The coefficient for the level of privacy regulation is statistically 
significant at the 1% level for all regressions. Column (1) shows the result only for the 
privacy variable (with sector fixed-effects results omitted). As expected, the coefficient is 
negative and significant. The higher the privacy regulation in a given country, the lower the 
number of web firms locating in this country. To have an idea, a reduction of one standard 
error of privacy variables explains the location of one firm.11  
This first regression does not involve any control variables and the magnitude of the 
coefficient of privacy may be biased. The following regressions progressively add control 
variables and the magnitude of the coefficient of privacy varies. Column (2) adds the level of 
profit taxes (from commercial operations) in the regression. This variable does not present a 
statistically significant coefficient. It may be explained by the fact that web companies can 
have operations and financial transactions in different countries.  
An important variable of control is the political stability of a country. As Tole and Koop 
(2008) point out, from the firm’s point of view there is a trade off between the level of 
regulation and the stability a given country can offer. For example, some less developed 
countries may offer lower regulation but they cannot necessarily assure stability for 
businesses in the long run. Regression (3) introduces this variable that is positive and 
significant. Under this control, the magnitude of the coefficient of privacy rises to -1.43.  
Column (4) adds other controls like the Transparency of Public Actions in the economic field 
and the Business Technological Environment. Both present the expected results: firms locate 
where economic actions are transparent and where the business and technological 
environments are important. The former is not statistically significant while the latter is highly 
statistically significant and robust (except in the last regression). 
Regression (5) introduces the number of internet users for and the logarithm of the number of 
servers hosted in each country. The internet users´ coefficient does not present a significant 
coefficient. One possible explanation is that users frequently set up webpages in different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 As a robustness test, table A4 provides the result of the same regressions using a negative binomial 
estimator. Results are very similar. 
 11 This number is obtained considering the average level of the location variable (2,59) and the standard 
error of the privacy variable (0,51). As the coefficient of column 1 is equal to 0.97, 1,28=0.97*0,51*2,59 
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locations. If the quantity of internet users does not matter for the location of firms, the 
quantity of servers seems fundamentally connected to this decision. The thinking behind for 
these results is also convergent; users can access the internet from anywhere but servers are 
location-specific. The increase of 10% in the number of servers in a country is related to a 
3,8% rise in internet firms, although causality cannot be determined.  
Finally, regression (6) replicates regression (5) discarding the United States from the sample. 
This test is very important, given that 25% of firms locate to this country. The United States 
also presents a low level of privacy restriction and one could imagine that another factor 
could explain simultaneously web firms’ location and the degree of privacy in the USA. 
Indeed, the coefficient of privacy is reduced in regression (6) but is still statistically 
significant at the 1% level. If one considers the United States, it raises the correlation between 
firms’ location and privacy, but this also applies to the data from the other countries.12 
Table 2 – Econometric Results – Poisson QMLE 
Dependent variable: Firms' 
Location (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample All All All All All No USA 
Privacy -0.97*** -0.97*** -1.43*** -1.58*** -0.67*** -0.36*** 
  (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.15) (0.12) (0.11) 
Ln(Tax)  0 0.26 0.87*** -0.45** -0.09 
   (0.33) (0.29) (0.25) (0.22) (0.19) 
Political Stability   2.21*** 1.53*** 0.67** 0.49** 
    (0.54) (0.46) (0.27) (0.23) 
Transparency of Public Economic 
Actions     0.04 0.25** 0.1 
     (0.15) (0.12) (0.10) 
Business Technological 
Environment     0.80*** 0.22** 0.06 
     (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) 
Internet users     -0.47 0 
      (0.30) (0.27) 
Ln(Servers)     0.38*** 0.13*** 
      (0.03) (0.05) 
Constant 3.26*** 3.28** -5.49** -7.65*** -5.64*** -2.52** 
  (0.42) (1.29) (2.39) (1.77) (1.13) (1.09) 
Observations 152 152 152 152 152 142 
Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. As data presents overdispersion, standard errors are 
corrected by the Pearson chi-squared statistic divided by the degrees of freedom. All regressions include sector 
fixed-effects. 
Table 2 presents very significant and robust results for the impact of privacy on the location 
of internet firms. The coefficient of privacy consistently produces a confidence level of less 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Table A5 in the Appendix tests the web 2 firms´ specificity including a dummy for these sectors, 
however its coefficient is not statistically significant. Table A5 also provides a robustness test including the 
share of firms per country minus the share of firms in the sector per country (in the sample). These results should 
be taken into account carefully because of the endogeneity these regressions present. Nonetheless, the privacy 
index variable remains statistically significant in these tests.  
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than 1%. Nonetheless, controls are not exhaustive and reverse causality may be an issue.13 
One can assume that multinationals, once located in a given country, may look for lower 
levels of privacy regulation through lobbying pressures. However, the privacy variable is 
based on macro measures14 and may contain errors. 15 
Missing variables, reverse causality and measure errors are a source of endogeneity that can 
be addressed by the use of instrumental variables. We apply two variables that are correlated 
to the privacy regulation level and are not correlated to the firm´s location. The first one is the 
quantity of civil society organizations in a given country. The United Nations Organization 
(UNO) attributes a consultative status for non-governmental organizations that “gives access 
to intergovernmental processes at the UNO dealing with economic and social development, 
gender issues, sustainable development, small arms, and human rights”.	   16 The quantity of 
civil societies in a country may have a strong negative correlation with the level of privacy 
regulation; countries that have more tolerant communities regarding non-governmental 
organizations are more likely to have lower levels of privacy regulation. Indeed, the 
regression of the Privacy variable on the Civil Society variable gives a t-statistic of -4.99 and 
an r2 of 0.1425. However, there is no reason for a firm to take into account the quantity of 
civil society organizations in a country for the choice of location. 
The second instrumental variable is the Freedom of the Press. We also expect that in countries 
where the press is freer, the privacy regulation level is lower. The regression of the privacy 
variable on the Freedom of the Press variable reports a t statistics of -7.26 for press freedom 
and an r2 of 0.2599. While the first instrument seems to fulfil the exclusion hypothesis, the 
second one sometimes fails in this task. One of the business models we have in our data is the 
fourth one: “online press & information services”. The Freedom of the Press variable could 
possibly impact upon the location of online newspapers. We address this issue dropping 
observations from this business model of the dataset. Table 3 reports results for the sample 
without business model four. We also provide in table A6 in the Appendix the results for the 
whole sample. 
Table 3 reproduces regressions (5) and (6) of table 2 using instrumental variables.  Columns 
(1) and (2) apply the Civil Society Variable as instrument, columns (3) and (4) apply the 
Freedom of the Press variable instead. Finally, columns (5) and (6) apply both the Civil 
Society and Freedom of the Press variables as instruments. Both the coefficient of privacy and 
its standard error are higher than OLS estimations. Privacy does have a negative impact on 
firms´ location even treating potential endogeneity. Moreover, higher coefficients indicate a 
measurement error in privacy data. Conditional on the exogeneity of the instruments, Wu-
Hauman tests confirm endogeneity in OLS estimations and Sargan/Hansen tests confirm the 
relative exogeneity of the instruments. 
Compared to the OLS interpretation of coefficients, in regression (5) a reduction of one 
standard error of the Privacy variable explains the location of two firms (instead of one firm, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Alternative regressions include GDP and GDP per capita. Results are similar and can be provided 
under request. 
14 See for details: https://www.privacyinternational.org/article/leading-surveillance-societies-eu-and-
world-2007. 
15 While these issues can be addressed by IV techniques, another problem remains. As we selected the 
124 most viewed firms on the internet for this analysis, a selection bias can be associated with these data by 
construction. 
16 Data are available on 
http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/displayAdvancedSearch.do?method=search&sessionCheck=false. 
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in the corresponding OLS estimation). It is also interesting to note other changes in variables. 
The coefficient of Taxes becomes non statistically significant, while Political Stability, 
Business Technological Environment gives coefficients with higher magnitudes and 
significance levels. 
Table 3 – Poisson QMLE Intrumental Variables 
Dependent variable: 
Firms' Location 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample All No USA All No USA All No USA 
IV Civil soc. Civil soc. Press 
freedom 
Press 
freedom 
Both Both 
Privacy -1.17*** -0.75*** -1.02*** -0.63*** -1.09*** -0.75*** 
 (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.16) (0.14) (0.15) 
Tax -0.04 0.03 -0.41* -0.05 -0.16 0 
 (0.26) (0.21) (0.23) (0.21) (0.23) (0.21) 
Political Stability 1.10*** 0.78*** 0.94*** 0.71*** 1.06*** 0.79*** 
 (0.20) (0.18) (0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) 
Transparency of Public 
Economic Actions  0.20* 0.13 0.30*** 0.13 0.22** 0.14 
 (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Business Technological 
Environment 0.25** 0.15* 0.30*** 0.13 0.28*** 0.16* 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
Internet Users -0.37 -0.14 -0.63** -0.13 -0.43* -0.17 
 (0.25) (0.21) (0.26) (0.22) (0.24) (0.21) 
Ln(Servers) 0.27*** 0.16*** 0.39*** 0.16*** 0.30*** 0.16*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Constant -6.04*** -3.89*** -6.65*** -3.53*** -6.21*** -3.98*** 
 (0.97) (1.09) (1.04) (1.06) (0.93) (1.04) 
Observations 143 134 143 134 143 134 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 0.0000 0.0115 0.0037 0.0021 0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan/Hansen (p-value)     0.8803 0.8798 
Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. As data presents overdispersion, standard errors are 
corrected by the Pearson chi-squared statistic divided by the degrees of freedom. All regressions include sector 
fixed-effects. See first step in table A7 in the Appendix. 
6. Discussion & Policy Recommendations 
In this paper, we investigate how privacy regulation influences the location decisions of 
internet firms. Our empirical results suggest that, in addition to classical factors such as 
political stability and spillovers, firms arbitrate according to differences in terms of privacy 
protection. Interestingly, this result is not more prevalent for internet firms that offer Web 2.0 
services, although their business models are mostly based on the exploitation of personal data. 
Moreover, our study gives empirical evidence to highlight a new 'privacy paradox'17 
according to which the more stringent certain privacy laws are, the more firms are induced to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The first 'privacy paradox' refers to the gap between people's privacy attitude and their actual behavior when 
they divulge their personal information when making a transaction or using social networking services (see 
Acquisti, 2004). 
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locate their business in less stringent countries, and finally the weaker actual privacy 
protection on the internet is. To some extent, this process would also be a favorable condition 
for the regulation of competition. 
Two legal implications can be formulated from our results.  
(1) The effectiveness of privacy regulation on the internet –as a 'global' network of networks– 
could justify a significant effort on the part of states to harmonize their privacy laws. Such an 
international agreement could be settled according to well-specified minimum standards as 
with the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in the field of 
intellectual property. However, unlike these agreements, it seems that the governments that 
are the most likely to enable the prisoner dilemma underlying the 'new privacy paradox' to be 
overcome are also those which fully benefit from the locations of internet firms in terms of 
comparative advantages. So individuals might suffer for a long time from this race to the 
bottom. In addition, legal harmonization can have two negative effects: first, internet firms 
would be deprived of an opportunity to innovate by arbitrating between different legal orders; 
second, the harmonized standards could be fixed according to the "relative weights of interest 
groups asking for legal standards that benefit themselves, which can create inefficiencies if 
those standard rules prove to be unbalanced and generate losses of welfare due to legal 
irreversibilities over time" (Ribstein & Kobayashi (2006). In the case of privacy, this risk 
seems to be prevalent because this social norm is currently moving and gqsit gives rise to 
many counter-claims from civil society, telemarketers, internet firms, and so on. 
(2) The impact of privacy reinforcement and/or harmonization in terms of social welfare 
seems to be very tricky to evaluate. On the one hand, governments look for comparative 
advantages. Privacy protection level might be one of them if softening it can lead to greater 
benefits from more innovative services. On the other hand, individuals act as if they do not 
care anymore about their information privacy or as if they value it on a different basis than the 
sole protection of their intimacy over the internet. What constitutes an ideal privacy as a 
social norm under the context of web 2.0? What is the actual impact of an improved 
preservation of privacy on individuals' welfare if they do not care about it? How can a balance 
be found between (more certain) welfare gains in terms of innovation and (more uncertain) 
welfare losses in terms of a reduction of privacy? To some extent, government should soften 
the legal standards for the protection of personal data in order to attract more internet firms 
and stimulate innovations in online services. A major political challenge is then to be able to 
rank national priorities including privacy and competitiveness. 
Finally, there are limitations to this research.  
First, our study is based on cross-sectional data and therefore it proves too static regarding the 
actual mobility of firms. One extension of this paper will consist in making a more dynamic 
analysis by collecting data on previous locations of firms as well as revisions to national 
privacy laws. Such a study would be all the more relevant since "the	   ‘race	   to	   the	  bottom’	  could	  be	  a	  theoretical	  curiosum"	  if	  no	  evidence	  is	  produced	  about	  both	  firm	  mobility	  in	  response	   to	   regulatory	   differences	   and	   competition	   between	   states	   towards	  more	   lax	  regulation	  (Bhagawati	  &	  Hudec,	  1995). 
Second, our sample is restricted to the first hundred internet firms in the Alexa.com ranking 
and excludes businesses such as porn websites and B2B platforms. While it covers the major 
internet firms and therefore those more likely to locate overseas, it might not be representative 
of all internet firms. Another extension will consist in increasing our sample.  
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Third, as already mentioned in section 4.2, the sample consists of location decisions in terms 
of headquarters and does not include more detailed features of these locations, i.e. servers, 
marketing departments, and so on. One extension of this paper will consist in featuring the 
types of each location more precisely.  
Lastly, we use sector-level, aggregated data – i.e. the distribution of firms according to their 
activities. Thus this analysis provides only an indirect test of the individual decisions in terms 
of locations. The next step will be to focus on firm-level data. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Definition of Variables 
Variable Definition Source 
Privacy Index The index is a scoring calculated with thirteen criteria: 
Constitutional protections; Statutory protection; Privacy 
enforcement; Identity cards & biometrics; Data sharing 
provisions; Visual surveillance; Communications 
interception; Workplace monitoring; Law enforcement 
access; Data retention practices; Travel & finance 
surveillance (including trans-border data sharing); Global 
leadership; Democratic safeguards 
Privacy International  
(The Privacy & Human 
Rights Report, 2007) 
Internet Users "people with access to the worldwide network." World Bank Development 
indicators + ITU 
Profit Tax "the amount of taxes on profits paid by the business." (% of 
commercial profits) 
World Bank Development 
indicators 
Political Stability Composite index (from 1 to 4) built from: 
- "Have the rules in force when the current head of state or 
government came to power changed in the last three years to 
improve the head of state or government's chances of staying 
in his/her position?" (from 1: rules significantly changed in 3 
years to 4 = unchanged) 
- "Did the current head of state or government come to power 
in compliance with the (changed) rules in force at the moment 
of his/her accession (election, dynastic succession, etc.)?" 
(from 1 = massive breach of the rules in force to 4 = total 
compliance with the rules) 
The legality of the process appointing these political 
authorities (from 1 = weak legal to 4 = high legal process) 
Cepii 
Transparency of Public 
Economic  Actions  
Transparency of economic policy (fiscal, budgetary, 
monetary, exchange rate, etc.) is a composite index (from 1 to 
4) built from:  
- "Is economic policy subject to an official communication? 
(from 1= thin and opaque to 4= substantial and transparent)" 
-"Is economic policy subject to public debate? (from 1= little 
debate to 4 = substantial and structured debate)" 
Cepii 
Business Technological 
Environment 
Technological environment and dissemination of technology 
are evaluated through a composite index (from 1 to 4) built 
from: "Proportion of technical staff (engineers, technicians) in 
SMEs/SMIs (from 1 = low to 4 = high)"; "Proportion of 
technical staff (engineers, technicians) in large firms (from 1 
= low to 4 = high)" ; "Cooperation links between businesses, 
universities and research centers (from 1 = few links to 4 = 
close links)" 
Cepii 
Number of Servers Number of Internet hosts available within a country. An 
Internet host is a computer connected directly to the Internet: 
normally an Internet Service Provider's (ISP) computer is a 
host. Internet users may use either a hard-wired terminal, at 
an institution with a mainframe computer connected directly 
to the Internet, or may connect remotely by way of a modem 
via telephone line, cable, or satellite to the Internet Service 
Provider's host computer. The number of hosts is one 
indicator of the extent of Internet connectivity. 
CIA World Factbook 
Quantity of Civil Societies Non-governmental organization that “gives access to 
intergovernmental process at the UNO dealing with economic 
and social development, gender issues, sustainable 
development, small arms, and human rights”. 
United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs 
Freedom of the Press This classification is established by Reporters Sans Frontières 
network which includes 15 associations for the  freedom of 
speech and expression, 130 correspondents, journalists, 
researchers, lawyers, or human rights militants. This network 
answers 50 questions allowing the evaluation of the freedom 
of the press situation in each country. 
Reporters Sans Frontières 
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Table A2. The construction of the dependent variable: 
The dependent variable is the sum of internet firms (in our sample) in a given sector 
established in each country. For example, Argentina hosts one firm in sector one, one firm in 
sector five and two firms in sector 6. The privacy index for Argentina is 2.8. 
Countries	  	  /	  Sectors	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	   9	   10	   Privacy	  index	  ARE	   1	   1	   	   	   	   1	   	   	   1	   	   -­‐	  ARG	   1	   	   	   	   1	   2	   	   	   	   	   2,8	  AUS	   3	   1	   	   	   2	   1	   	   	   1	   	   2,3	  …	  USA	   38	   20	   24	   8	   15	   27	   5	   1	   6	   1	   1,5	  VNM	   	   	   	   	   	   1	   	   	   	   	   -­‐	  ZAF	   	   	   	   	   	   2	   	   	   1	   	   2,3	  
 
Description of the sectors Web 2 sectors 
1 search engines & web portals   - 
2 online networking services √ 
3 web hosting & sharing services √ 
4 online press & information services   - 
5 infomediaries   - 
6 e-commerce   - 
7 corporate websites   - 
8 online administration   - 
9 e-advertising   - 
10 online games   - 
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A3. Statistical distribution of the dependent variable 
 
 
	   21	  
Table A4 – Econometric Results – Negative Binominal Regressor 
Dependent variable: Firms' 
Location (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample All All All All All No USA 
Privacy -0.89* -0.89* -1.15** -1.23*** -0.67*** -0.36** 
  (0.46) (0.46) (0.45) (0.33) (0.14) (0.16) 
Ln(Tax)  -0.03 0.14 0.70* -0.45 -0.09 
   (0.28) (0.30) (0.38) (0.30) (0.26) 
Political Stability   1.74*** 1.25*** 0.67** 0.49** 
    (0.65) (0.38) (0.29) (0.23) 
Transparency of public 
economic actions  
   0.03 0.25 0.1 
     (0.16) (0.15) (0.10) 
Business Technological 
Environment 
   0.67*** 0.22** 0.06 
     (0.23) (0.11) (0.10) 
Internet Users     -0.47* 0 
      (0.28) (0.21) 
Ln(Servers)     0.38*** 0.13** 
      (0.04) (0.05) 
Constant 3.09*** 3.19** -3.75 -6.14*** -5.64*** -2.52** 
  (1.17) (1.58) (2.30) (2.29) (1.33) (1.15) 
Observations 152 152 152 152 152 142 
As probchibar2<alpha for the last regression, a negative binomial estimator can provide robustness. Nonetheless, 
results for privacy are very close to those of the Poisson QMLE estimator. Robust standard errors in brackets are 
clustered by country.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include sector fixed-effects. 
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Table A5: Spillovers Robustness Test 
 
Dependent variable: Firms' 
Location (1) (2) (3) 
Sample All All No USA 
Privacy -0.60*** -0.41*** -0.19** 
  (0.17) (0.13) (0.10) 
Ln(Tax) -0.42 -0.19 -0.16 
  (0.31) (0.22) (0.17) 
Political Stability 0.63 0.52* 0.3 
  (0.39) (0.26) (0.20) 
Transparency of Public 
Economic Actions  0.12 0.12 -0.04 
  (0.17) (0.12) (0.09) 
Business Technological 
Environment 0.19 0.1 0.09 
  (0.14) (0.10) (0.08) 
Internet Users -0.26 -0.12 -0.18 
  (0.42) (0.30) (0.23) 
Ln(Servers) 0.33*** 0.18*** 0.02 
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Other Internet Firms  4.68*** 22.70*** 
   (1.17) (3.47) 
Web 2 Dummy 0.19   
  (0.15)   
Constant -5.11*** -2.80** 0.01 
  (1.61) (1.29) (1.04) 
Observations 152 152 142 
Sector fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. As data presents overdispersion, standard errors are 
corrected by the Pearson chi-squared statistic divided by the degrees of freedom. 
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Table A6 – Poisson QMLE Intrumental Variables Including Business Model 4 (online 
press) 
Dependent variable: Firms' 
Location 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample All No USA All No USA All No USA 
IV Civil soc. Civil soc. Press 
freedom 
Press 
freedom 
Both Both 
Privacy -1.16*** -0.76*** -1.04*** -0.65*** -1.08*** -0.75*** 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.16) (0.13) (0.15) 
Tax -0.05 0.02 -0.39* -0.06 -0.16 -0.02 
 (0.25) (0.21) (0.22) (0.20) (0.23) (0.21) 
Political Stability 1.11*** 0.79*** 0.97*** 0.73*** 1.07*** 0.80*** 
 (0.20) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) 
Transparency of Public 
Economic Actions  0.20* 0.13 0.29*** 0.13 0.21** 0.14 
 (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Business Technological 
Environment 0.26*** 0.16* 0.31*** 0.14 0.28*** 0.16** 
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) 
Internet Users -0.36 -0.13 -0.60** -0.13 -0.41* -0.16 
 (0.25) (0.20) (0.25) (0.21) (0.23) (0.20) 
Ln(Servers) 0.27*** 0.16*** 0.38*** 0.16*** 0.29*** 0.16*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Constant -6.01*** -3.92*** -6.59*** -3.57*** -6.15*** -3.97*** 
 (0.95) (1.07) (1.01) (1.05) (0.91) (1.03) 
Observations 152 142 152 142 152 142 
Wu-Hausman (p-value) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0028 0.0022 0.0000 0.0018 
Sargan/Hansen (p-value)     0.8930 0.7812 
Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. As data presents overdispersion, standard errors are 
corrected by the Pearson chi-squared statistic divided by the degrees of freedom. All regressions include sector 
fixed-effects. See first step in table A8 below. 
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Table A7 – First step of Table 3 (Instrumental variables) 
Dependent variable: Firms' 
Location 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample All No USA All No USA All No USA 
IV Civil soc. Civil soc. Press 
freedom 
Press 
freedom 
Both Both 
Civil societies -0.62*** -0.97***   -0.42*** -0.51*** 
x 1000 (0.08) (0.16)   (0.08) (0.17) 
Freedom of the Press   -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Tax 0.17 0.19 0.44*** 0.25** 0.23** 0.25** 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Political Stability 0.79*** 0.87*** 0.09 0.18 0.30** 0.31** 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) 
Transparency of Public  
Economic Actions  
0.21*** 0.21*** -0.36*** -0.31*** -0.18** -0.16 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
Business Technological 
Environment 
0.24*** 0.42*** 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Internet Users -0.79*** -0.69*** -1.09*** -1.15*** -1.27*** -1.30*** 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) 
Ln(Servers) 0.12*** 0.14*** -0.14*** -0.04 0.01 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant -4.22*** -5.12*** 4.08*** 2.60*** 1.08 0.91 
 (0.77) (0.75) (0.92) (0.96) (1.00) (1.08) 
Observations 143 134 143 134 143 134 
R-squared 0.52 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.65 0.61 
Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include sector fixed-effects. 
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Table A8 – First step of Table A6 (instrumental variables) 
Dependent variable: Firms' 
Location 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample All No USA All No USA All No USA 
IV Civil soc. Civil soc. Press 
freedom 
Press 
freedom 
Both Both 
Civil Societies -0.63*** -0.94***   -0.44*** -0.39** 
x 1000 (0.08) (0.17)   (0.07) (0.16) 
Freedom of the Press   -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.01*** 
   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Tax 0.16 0.22 0.45*** 0.24* 0.23** 0.32*** 
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) 
Political Stability 0.80*** 0.81*** 0.08 0.16 0.29** 0.49*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) 
Transparency of Public 
Economic Actions  
0.23*** 0.28*** -0.38*** -0.33*** -0.18** -0.20** 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) 
Business Technological 
Environment 
0.24*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.34*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) 
Internet Users -0.77*** -0.90*** -1.03*** -1.11*** -1.25***  
 (0.20) (0.22) (0.20) (0.19) (0.18)  
Ln(Servers) 0.13*** 0.12*** -0.15*** -0.03 0.02 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant -4.38*** -4.57*** 4.24*** 2.64*** 1.04 -0.85 
 (0.76) (0.78) (0.92) (0.95) (0.99) (1.14) 
Observations 152 142 152 142 152 142 
R-squared 0.53 0.48 0.57 0.58 0.66 0.58 
Standard errors in brackets *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include sector fixed-effects. 
 
 
 
 
 	  
